University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
From the SelectedWorks of Howard W Brill

1980

The Arkansas Supreme Court
Committee on Professional Conduct
1969-1979: A Call for Reform
Howard W Brill

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/howard_brill/18/

The Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on
Professional Conduct 1969-1979: A Call for
Reform *
Howard W. Brill"

*

In most states the legal profession and the general public have been
forced to endure a fragmented and non-uniform mechanism for disciplining attorneys who are guilty of professional misconduct.t This has not
been the case in Arkansas. Although it lacks an integrated bar, the state
for four decades has enjoyed a unified disciplinary system under the control of the Arkansas Supreme Court. 2 Arkansas' centralized approach to
regulating the legal profession has been justifiably praised, but significant
weaknesses hamper its continued effectiveness. This article reviews the
development of the disciplinary system in Arkansas, evaluates the existing
structure and criticizes, in some instances, the application of the rules and
procedures governing the discipline of attorneys. The purpose of this review is to demonstrate that problems exist and to suggest reforms that
should help correct them.
I.

EVOLUTION, COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE
SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT

The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized as early as 1860 an inherent power in the state's courts to discipline attorneys in order to protect
the public and maintain the honor of the legal profession.:t No formal
*
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1. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVAULATION oF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCENIENT:
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT

24-30 (1970) (This

Committee was chaired by Justice Tom C. Clark and hereinafter will be cited as the Clark
Report).
2. See the references in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 848 n. I (Harlan, J., concurring).
3. Beene v. The State, 22 Ark. 149 (1860). The trial court disbarred the attorney -on
account of a most unwarrantable, unprovoked and infamous personal attack upon the honorable judge." Id.at 150. Although reversing the judgment for lack of notice and a hearing,
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disciplinary procedure existed until 1939, a year after amendment 28 was
added to the state constitution. 4 Pursuant to the express authority conferred upon it by amendment 28, the Arkansas Supreme Court promul-'5
gated "Rules Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law."
Those Rules adopted "the canons of ethics of the American Bar Association as the standard of professional conduct of attorneys at law" and established a procedure for disciplining lawyers who violated them.
Central to this procedure was a committee, eventually known as the Bar
Rules Committee, charged with the responsibilities of investigating complaints of professional misconduct and initiating disciplinary actions either at the committee or trial court level when the committee believed
6
reasonable grounds existed for doing so.
The Court in 1969 made several important changes in the Rules. It
adopted the American Bar Association's (ABA) newly promulgated Code
of Professional Responsibility (Code) as the standard of professional conduct for Arkansas lawyers. The Court thereby became the first in the
nation to embrace the Code as the embodiment of ethical principles for
attorneys in its jurisdiction to follow. 7 At the same time, another importhe Court emphasized that though the charges against the attorney may not have come
within the statute, the Court had the inherent power to disbar an attorney for causes not
included within the statute. See also Hurst v. Bar Rules Committee of the State of Arkansas,
202 Ark. 1101, 1109, 155 S.W.2d 697, 700 (1941).
The actions brought under this inherent power and under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-401
(Repl. 1962), see text accompanying notes 77-96 in/ra, were initiated by both Bar Associations, e.g., State ex. rel. Greene County Bar v. Huddleston, 173 Ark. 686, 293 S.W. 353
(1927), and state officials, e.g., McGehee v. State, 182 Ark. 603, 32 S.W.2d 308 (1930).
4. ARK. CONST. amend. 28 provides "The Supreme Court shall make rules regulating
the practice of law and the professional conduct of attorneys of law."
5. The early rules may be found at 207 Ark. xxxiv-xxxvii (1944). Appendix A contains the citations for the rules and subsequent amendments. Subsequent changes to these
rules are not always published in the official and unofficial reporters.
6. See Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm., 202 Ark. 1101, 1109, 155 S.W.2d 697, 701 (1941).
Although the new procedure removes the power of a trial judge to hold an attorney in
contempt and remove his license to practice, see Ex Parte Burton, 237 Ark. 454, 373 S.W.2d
409 (1963), the trial court does retain the power to punish contempt by.an attorney with an
appropriate fine or sentence. See Davis v. Merritt, 252 Ark. 659, 480 S.W.2d 924 (1972).
From the adoption of the rules in 1939 through 1969 only five disciplinary opinions were
issued by the Supreme Court: Ex parte Barton, 237 Ark. 454, 373 S.W.2d 409 (1963) (Attorney suspended for 3 years; petition for reinstatement granted after one year); Whitsitt v. Bar
Rules Comm., 223 Ark. 860, 269 S.W.2d 699 (1954) (Attorney disbarred for several violations); Armitage v. Bar Rules Comm., 223 Ark. 465, 266 S.W.2d 818 (1954) (Attorney disbarred); Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm., 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W.2d 697 (1941) (Attorney
suspended for one year because he attempted to bribe jurors at $5.00 a person); Bar Rules
Committee of the State of Arkansas v. Richardson, 202 Ark. 417, 150 S.W.2d 953 (1941)
(attorney suspended for one year because he attempted to bribe jurors at $5.00 a person).
The limited number of appellate opinions and the lack of statistical information during this
30 year period makes evaluation impossible.
7. See Wright, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: Its Histoqy and Objectites, 24 ARK.
L. REV. I (1970). See alsofootnote 13 to Pret'mtnay Note accompanying THE ARKANSAS
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, pages 606-608, this issue.
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tant change was made in the Rules. The Bar Rules Committee was reconstituted, renamed the "Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Conduct" (The Committee), and rejuvenated by being given the authority to hire an executive secretary. 8 The Rules have been further amended
by the Court since 1969, but the name and principal functions of the
Committee have remained unchanged.
Under the present Rules, the Supreme Court appoints the Committee which has seven members, one from each congressional district and
three from the state at large, each of whom serves a seven-year term. 9
The Rules specify that the Committee shall be composed of "seven lawyers.'" If a proposal to add laypersons was made, the ensuing arguments
would be familiar ones. Those favoring the idea would emphasize (1) the
enhanced social perspective that results from having non-lawyers on the
Committee; (2) the danger of unbalanced or disproportionate regulation
if the matter is controlled totally by lawyers; and (3) the fact that because
the legal profession owes a duty to the public as well as to its own members, the non-lawyer public should be represented."' Those opposing any
such proposal would argue (1) that charges of misconduct sometimes
hinge on the handling of complex legal issues that non-lawyers are unable
to understand; (2) that the confidentially of the Committee's deliberations
cannot be insured if laypersons are included in its membership; and (3)
that for a variety of reasons only attorneys can fairly regulate and judge
their colleagues.
The Court has considered the notion of employing non-lawyers on
8.

See Huiejurtr Dictum, 4 ARK. LAW. 16-19 (March 1970).

9. Rule II, Rules of the Court Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law (as
amended Feb. 19, 1979) (hereinafter cited as Rule -). The references throughout this article are to the current rule numbers, not to the numbers prior to the 1976 reorganization. See

Appendix A.
10. Id. Editor's note: Since this article was written, the composition of the Committee
has been changed to include non-lawyers. See Appendix A. The first non-lawyer appointed
to the committee is Susan Miller, Chairperson Science Department, Henderson Junior High
School, Little Rock, Arkansas.
11. The recently proposed ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (Proposed Draft, Dec.
1978) (hereinafter STANDARDS) call for one-third of the disciplinary board members to be
nonlawyers. Id at 8-9. The STANDARDS, drafted by the Joint Committee on Professional
Discipline, were approved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates in February,
1979.
According to the Center for Professional Responsibility, fifteen states currently have
non-lawyers serving on disciplinary boards or in some other disciplinary capacity. NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR RULE

OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 4 n.5 (3d ed. 1977) (hereinafter GUIDELINES). The states

are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See generally
Lobe, Confessions of a Nonlawyer on a Dict/lnagy Board, 51 FLA. B.J. 76 (1977).
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other committees associated with regulating the legal profession.12 Recently the Court created a Committee on Unauthorized Practice and provided that three of the seven members would be non-lawyers.' 3 The first
appointees to this committee are representatives of the banking, real estate and title insurance professions. Thus, it is conceivable that non-lawyers may eventually become members of the Committee.
The administrative structure of the Committee on Professional Conduct is fairly simple. The Rules authorize the Committee to elect a chairman and a secretary from among its membership and to formulate its
own procedural rules.' 4 The Committee is also permitted to hire an executive secretary. This person cannot be a member of the Committee and
cannot vote on matters presented to it, but he is the principal coordinator
of its work. Among other responsibilities, the executive secretary receives
complaints of professional misconduct, assists complainants in preparing
required affidavits, circulates complaints among the Committee, and conducts investigations. 15 His salary is paid from the license fee imposed by
the Court on practicing attorneys in the state. This fee is the only source
of revenue for the Committee, whose entire budget is small in relation to
those of comparable entities throughout the nation.
The budgetary problem brought former United States Supreme
Court Justice Tom Clark to Arkansas in June, 1970, on a "sad mission." 1"
While praising the centralized disciplinary structure symbolized by the
Committee on Professional Conduct, he emphasized certain shortcomings
of the 1969.procedure: inadequate funding for effective enforcement, the
lack of staffing, and the need for reciprocal enforcement. 17 The Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded in 1971 that the employment of a full time
executive secretary required an increased Committee budget. Following
discussions, the Court increased the Supreme Court license fee from $2.00
8
per year to $17.00 per year effective January 1, 1972 to fulfill this need.'
A member of the Arkansas Bar contested the validity of the fee in12. The Arkansas Bar Association has recommended that three non-lawyers be added
to the Committee. Arkansas Gazette, September 16, 1979, at 1,col. 5.
A 1977 statute provided that every state board or commission "whose membership consists solely of persons actively engaged in the occupation or profession regulated" shall be
enlarged by the addition of one member who is not a member of the profession. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 6-617 (Supp. 1977). The Supreme Court Committee, as an arm ofa separate branch
of the government, is not subject to this provision. But see Editor's note, note 10 supra.
13. Per Curiam Order, 264 Ark. 960 (1978). See Addenda, 13 ARK. LAW. 188 (1979).
14. Rule II, note 9 supra. The Committee has adopted internal rules governing such
matters as regular meeting times and places, the quorum requirement, and communications
within the Committee.
15. Rule III, note 9 supra.
16. Clark, Dircs,bhnarv Enforcement. A Comphbnent anda Challenge, 4 ARK. LAW. 84 (Sept.
1970).
17. Id. at 85-87.
18. In the Matter of Supreme Court License Fees, 251 Ark. 800, 483 S.W.2d 174
(1972); Huie, jur Dictum, 6 ARK. LAw. 15 (1972); Huie, Jurs Dtictum, 6 ARK. LAW. 64
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crease. He argued that 1) the Supreme Court did not have the authority
to make the order; 2) the increase violated both the federal and state constitutions; and 3) the change could not become effective until approved in
a mail ballot by a majority of licensed Arkansas attorneys.' 9 Emphasizing its constitutional duty to make and enforce rules governing the practice of law, the Supreme Court easily rejected all three grounds for
challenging the Court's action. Effective enforcement of the Rules requires a full time secretary. In addition, under the Arkansas Constitution,
the Supreme Court possesses general supervisory powers over the judicial
branch of the government. 20 This supervisory responsibility and the regulation and control of attorneys cannot depend on a vote by attorneys.
Since the Court has been given the duty to supervise the practice of law it
must, by necessary implication, have the power required to carry out that
duty.
The petitioner contended, however, that a $17.00 per year fee was
too high. Reviewing the work load of the Committee and the proposed
initial budget of $28,000.00 per year, the Court found the figure to be
appropriate. But the Court did concede that the license fee should be
21
adjusted annually to ensure that income and expenses are balanced.
The National Center for Professional Responsibility recommends
that for effective discipline, the appropriate agencies should have a
budget based on $22.00 to $23.00 per year per attorney.22 While some
states have devoted as much as $70.00 per year per attorney, 23 Arkansas,
with an average expenditure of $10.00 per year per attorney, 24 is far be(1972). Justice Clark subsequently praised these developments. See Clark, The Challengesare
Beig Met in Arkansas, 6 ARK. LAW. 64 (1972).

19.
(1972).

In the Matter of Supreme Court License Fees, 251 Ark. 800, 483 S.W.2d 174

ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 4.
21. The annual fee was subsequently reduced to $15. See Per Curiam Order of November 13, 1973, at 499 S.W.2d (Arkansas Cases) xxii (1973) (This order does not appear in
either the Arkansas Reports or the full Southwest Reports).
22. Interview with Marcia L. Proctor, National Center for Professional Responsibility,
in Chicago, Illinois (Apr. 23, 1979). The disciplinary expenditure for the 35 states reporting
in 1976 was $19 per licensed attorney within the state, ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL

20.

DISCIPLINE, DISCIPLINARY LAW AND PROCEDURE RESEARCH SYSTEM, Disciphhary Law and

ProcedureIndex (Grievance Referral List of Lawyer Disciplinary Agencies) 4, Chart 11 (1978).
23. With an annual cost of $70.12 per attorney in 1978, in addition to $15 per year for
the Clients' Security Fund, Florida may be devoting the largest amount to discipline. Florida Bar News, September 15, 1978, at 3, col. 4.
24. For 1977 the Committee had a budget of $45,000.00 and actual expenditures of
$33,133.00 or $9.00 per attorney. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, DISCIPLINARY LAW AND PROCEDURE RESEARCH SYSTEM, Disci ohna, Law and Procedure Index (Griev-

ance Referral List of Lawyer Disciplinary Agencies) 13 (1978). The Committee's 1978
budget was $48,107.00 and actual 1978 expenditures were $39,166.33, which included the
purchase of copying equipment for the Committee. The budget annually includes several
thousand dollars for attorneys' fees in disbarment proceedings, and this amount is usually
not expended. Letter from Taylor R. Roberts to Howard W. Brill (Sept. 7, 1979).
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low the recommended level. Though the Supreme Court currently collects license fees of $15.00 per year, the resulting total is used to finance
three committees in addition to the Committee on Professional Conduct.
The existing shortage of disciplinary funds is particularly manifested in
the Committee's need for a full time office secretary and the need for an
additional investigator. In view of a decade of rising costs, the increased
number of attorneys in the state, the partial distribution of income derived from the annual license fee to other groups and a present inability
to acquire needed personnel, disciplinary enforcement in Arkansas is
hampered by the apparent reluctance of the Court to devote more re25
sources to this task.

II. FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
A.

Investigations

Nothing in the Rules expressly permits the executive secretary to act
in a manner similar to a prosecutor or foreman of a grand jury and to
investigate suspected cases of possible misconduct without a formal accusation. Rule III authorizes investigations by him only when a complaint has
beenfiled. Rule IV, however, gives the Committee the authority to investigate not only "complaints of misconduct that may be brought to its attention in the form of an affidavit," but also those "in respect of which any
member of the Committee may have information." In actual practice,
inquiries are made into cases of suspected misconduct without formal
26
complaints having been filed.
This process of making independent inquiries has apparently been
approved by the Supreme Court. In Weems V. Supreme Court Committee on
ProfessionalMisconduct,2 7 an attorney who had been found guilty of unpro25. Concluding that funds for disciplinary purposes were needed beyond the $50 already annually required, the Mississippi Supreme Court recently ordered: a) a special assessment of $25; b) an investigation fee, payable by the attorney disciplined; and c) expenses
of litigation to be awarded to the disciplinary agency. Matter of Miss. State Bar, 361 So.2d
503 (Miss. 1978). An innovative source of additional funds w( uld be income generated from
the investment of trust funds held for clients. See Matter of Interest on Trust Accounts: A
Petition of the Florida Bar to Amend the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules
Governing the Practice of Law, 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978), modified, 372 So. 2d 67 (1979).
The Arkansas Bar Foundation isconsidering such a program, though the income would not
be devoted to disciplinary purposes. See Kieffer, Arkansas Bar Foundation, 13 ARK. LAW. 51
(1979); Love, Arkansas Bar Foundation, 14 ARK. LAW. 3 (1980).

26. Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee
on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (June 15, 1979). One specific problem highlighted
by the Clark Committee was that few investigations are initiated without a specific complaint being made. Clark Report, note I supra, at 60-66. The Standards provide that a proceeding may be initiated upon the complaint of a person or entity or upon the Committee's
own motion "in light of information received or acquired from any source." Standards, note
II supra, at 46.
27. 257 Ark. 673, 523 S.W.2d 900 (1975).

1980

COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

577

fessional conduct challenged the validity of the proceedings against him.
He argued that Rule IV required "an affidavit of complaint or a statement that a member of the committee had information. ' 28 The Court
disagreed:
[Tihe rules permit investigation from any source. Investigation by the
Committee may be commenced without an affidavit being signed by the
client. The nature or the form of the information which causes the committee to commence the investigation is not jurisdictional and a statement of the source is not required.29
The Court reasoned that this interpretation of the Rules was necessary to
insure the Committee "free and easy access of information regarding the
activities of the members of the bar."' 30 The authority to conduct independent investigations is clearly essential to the Committee's purpose of
maintaining "the highest standards of ethical conduct in the practice of
law."31 The Court's recognition of this authority in Weems should be
spelled out in the Rules.
Newspaper reports about the activities of some attorneys suggest that
ethical violations frequently occur but result in no disciplinary action because the clients involved fail to complain. The classic situation involves
a conflict of interest between two present clients or a present and former
client. 32 For example, a city attorney with a private practice may represent a client in the client's dealings with the city. Or, a lawyer who formerly worked for the Public Service Commission may represent a utility
who must appear before the Commission. Who will formally complain of
possible ethical violations in such cases? 33 Perhaps the press could file
complaints with the Committee. It is not clear whether a member of the
press or another "public citizen" has ever initiated disciplinary proceedings. 34 An opposing attorney might lodge a complaint. The Committee
should invite reports of suspected ethical violations by members of the
bar, particularly since the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes a
28.

Id at 684, 523 S.W.2d at 906.

29, Id.

30.
31.

Id
Id.

32. An increased awareness of conflict of interest problems may be indicated by Mann
v. Britt, 266 Ark. 100, 583 S.W.2d 21 (1979) (attorney barred from representing accused
because he formerly represented co-defendants), noted Recent Developments, 33 Ark. L. Rev.
435 (1979). See alsoHolloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (the failure to provide separate counsel for three defendants constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
the sixth amendment), reversing Holloway v. State, 260 Ark. 250, 539 SW.2d 435 (1976).
See also Annot., Attorneys and Client Conflict of Interest inReal-Estate Closing Situations, 68
A.L.R.2d 967 (1976); Annot., What Constitutes Representationof Con Wting Interests Subjecting Attorney to DTscilinaqv Action, 17 A.L.R.3d 835 (1968).
33. Other instances in which misconduct by the attorney may benefit the client include fraudulent marriages for immigration purposes, exaggerated personal injury claims
and fee referrals with bail bondsmen. See Clark Report, note I supra, at 64.

34. Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee
on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (June 15, 1979).
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duty on lawyers to take such action. 35 Trial judges will often have the
most intimate knowledge of misconduct in some cases. Yet judges have
apparently been reluctant to report lawyers to the Committee. 36 This
may change. A recent Supreme Court order to notify the Committee of
specific infractions of the Appellate Rules implies an increased awareness
and recognition of the judiciary's role in this regard. 3 7 A standing policy
requiring both trial and appellate judges to identify lawyers who are suspected of ethical misbehavior and to report them to the Committee is
needed. Such a procedure would enhance the possibility of dealing with
misconduct at an early stage and help to mitigate the resulting harm to
clients and the public.
After receiving an allegation of misconduct and conducting an initial
inquiry, the executive secretary forwards the accused attorney a copy of
the formal complaint and allows him ten days to file a written answer. 38
Copies of the complaint and the answer are then distributed to the Committee members who also receive any exhibits, memoranda, or recommendations prepared by the executive secretary, and a printed ballot. If a
majority of the Committee votes to take no action, the matter is closed,
and the executive secretary notifies the attorney and the complainant of
the Committee's decision. 39 If the Committee votes to take some action,
35. Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A): "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of [these rules) shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation." See footnote 13 to Prehiminary Note
accompanying THE ARKANSAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, pages 606-608,

this issue.
36. Over the past decade some trial judges have been increasingly more willing to
report attorneys to the Committee. The vast majority of complaints, however, still come
from clients. Interview with Ben Core, Member, Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Conduct, in Fort Smith, (Aug. 9, 1979). See footnote 13 to Prelininary Note accompanying
THE ARKANSAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, pages 606-608, this issue.

See also Solomon, Trials and Tribulationsof a Member ofthe Supreme Court Committee on Professoonal Conduct, 12 ARK. LAw. 76, 77 (1978): "One of the most serious [problems] is the failure
of lawyers and sometimes judges to bring to the attention of the committee . . . situations
that need investigation." Id.
37. The Supreme Court ordered, with two justices dissenting, that when a belated
appeal is taken in a criminal case, with no good cause shown, the Court will publish an
order allowing the appeal and giving the name of the lawyer who was at fault. A copy of
that order will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct, to be available to
the Committee "if any complaint of any kind should later be filed against that lawyer." Per
Curiam Order 265 Ark. _, 574 S.W.2d (Arkansas Cases) xxx (1979) (265 ARK. Sup. CT.
ADV. Rt'TRS., Feb. 5, 1979, No. 1, Appendix).
38. Rule III, note 9 supra. Concerned that the verification requirement and other formalities might discourage valid complaints against attorneys, the Clark Committee recommended that verification be eliminated and other formalities be minimized. See Clark Report,
note I supra, at 71-73. See also STANDARDS, note I I supra, at 46-47. Procedural due process
requires that an attorney receive fair notice of the disciplinary charges made against him. In
Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968). But see Dorf, Disbarment in the UnitedStates, 12 COLUM.
J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 25 (1975): "IW]hatever rule Ruffalo was meant to set down has
been largely ignored." Id.
39. Rule III, note 9 supra.
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its options include cautioning or reprimanding the attorney expare.40 An
attorney disciplined in this manner may request a formal hearing before
the Committee. If no hearing is requested, the order is made permanent
and may be a factor considered by the Committee in any future proceedings against the attorney. 4 t If a hearing is requested, however, it is conducted de novo and the initial vote to take action is ignored. In some cases
involving allegations of serious or repeated offenses, the Committee may

not decide what action to take, if any, until it has conducted a formal
hearing.
B.

Formal Hearings

The Rules do not specify the exact format of a formal hearing, but in
practice the hearing proceeds like a civil trial.4 2 The executive secretary
may attend and act as counsel for the Committee in the presentation of
43
testimony and evidence.
Under the Rules, the Committee has authority to issue subpoenas to
compel the production of documents or the appearance of a witness. The
44
subpoena may be served on any person by any sheriff within the state.
This type of statewide subpoena authority, which can force an individual
to travel to another part of the state for a hearing, was objected to by one
Arkansas Supreme Court Justice when the Supreme Court Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of Law was created. 41 Potential unfairness could
be avoided if the formal hearing is held in the county where the attorney
resides or practices. Such a procedure would be consistent with Rule IV
which states that venue for a disbarment suit lies in the county where the
attorney resides or where the offenses were committed. Changing the sites
of the disciplinary hearing, however, would require the Committee to
travel rather than the attorney and the witnesses. It may be that when
seven committee members, who serve without pay, meet on perhaps six to
40. Until February, 1979, the Committee also had the power to issue letters of reproval.
41. Interview with Ben Core, Member, Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Conduct, in Fort Smith (August 9, 1979), A better practice would be a specific rule authorizing increased discipline for repeated offenses. See, e.g., In the Matter of Yates, 91 Wash. 2d
482, 588 P.2d 1164, 91 Wash. 2d 482 (1978). The STANDARDS recommend a specific rule
that disciplinary proceedings should not be subject to any statute of limitations. STANDARDS, note I I supra, at 28.
42. The internal rules of the Committee provide that "there shall be no formal requirements as to the proceedings . . . but order shall be preserved and the Committee shall attempt to develop the facts." AMENDED RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON
PROrESSIONAL CONDUCT, adopted June 14, 1969 and amended August 20, 1977. Since it
sits as a fact-finding body and not as an adversary tribunal, the Committee does not strictly
adhere to the rules of evidence.
43. Rule III, note 9 supra.
44. Rule II, note 9 supra.
45. Per Curiam Order, 264 Ark. 960 (1978) (Byrd, J., dissenting).
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ten Saturdays a year, the meetings are best held in a single central location. In actuality all formal hearings but one have been held in Little
4
Rock. 6
If the Committee can compel attendance, may the accused attorney
be forced to testify or produce documents in his possession? Usually in a
proceeding against an attorney, the Committee can acquire any necessary
evidence from a client, court records, or other sources. Occasionally, however, the most crucial information can only be obtained from the attorney. Although the last sentence of Rule II provides that "disobedience of
any summons or subpoena or a refusal to testify shall be regarded as constructive contempt of the Supreme Court," it is not clear that this regulation means the attorney loses his protection against self-incrimination.
Under the subpoena duces tecum power of Rule II, a defendant is obligated to respond to requests for testimony or documents. 4 7 In addition,
cases from other jurisdictions have ruled that an attorney may be compelled to testify in disciplinary hearings because the procedure is not
criminal in nature.4 8 No Arkansas case has dealt with this problem.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is available to a witness or a
party defendant at any proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
if the answer to a question might subject him to criminal liability. 49 In
addition, the United States Supreme Court has specifically held that an
attorney has the right to invoke a fifth amendment privilege at disciplinary hearings if he reasonably believes the state may use testimony
against him in a future criminal prosecution. .
A grant of immunity to the affected lawyer presents one means of
dealing with this problem. If the Committee finds (1) the testimony of
the attorney or the documents in his possession to be crucial to the case
against him, and (2) the Committee believes disciplinary action against
the attorney is more important than possible criminal sanctions, the Committee should compel testimony by giving the accused immunity from
46. Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee
on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock Uun. 15, 1979). A major administrative problem of
the current Committee setup is the task of arranging suitable times when the members can
meet. Although not yet utilized, conference telephone calls are a possibility.
47. Rule II, note 9 supra. Interview with Ben Core, Member, Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, in Fort Smith (Aug. 9, 1979).
48. See Black v. Cal. State Bar, 7 Cal. 2d 676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1972);
Maryland Bar v. Sugarman, 272 Md. 306, 329 A.2d I, cert. denmed, 420 U.S. 974 (1975); State
of Mich. v. Block, 175 N.W.2d 769 (Mich. 1970); State v. Pasterino, 53 Wis. 2d 412, 193
N.W.2d 1 (1972).
Possessing elements of both civil and criminal procedure, disciplinary proceedings are
best characterized as sui geeris. See STFANDARDS, note I I supra at 2-3.

49.

Leskewitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).

50.

Spevack v. Kline, 385 U.S. 511 (1968), rev d, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1963).
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subsequent criminal prosecution. 5 ' Although the United States Supreme
Court has not specifically ruled on this point,5 2 other courts generally
hold that an attorney can be forced to testify in a disciplinary hearing by
granting him immunity from criminal prosecution.53 The Illinois
Supreme Court recently reached this conclusion because it found disciplinary hearings to be remedial and not criminal in nature. 4 Although the
attorney may cite the privilege against self-incrimination, the important
common interests in protecting the public, administering justice, and
maintaining the integrity of the legal profession outweigh individual concerns once immunity is granted.
Since the disciplinary hearing is not criminal, however, the immunity granted does not apply to a hearing under the Rules. Likewise, if a
lawyer testifies in a criminal prosecution under a grant of immunity, his
testimony may be used against him in a subsequent civil disciplinary
hearing.5 5 - The Committee has never found it necessary to consider a
grant of immunity. 56 Indeed, the Committee's authority to grant immunity is unclear since it is questionable whether the Supreme Court, which
57
created the Committee, has the inherent power to authorize immunity.
But, without either a legislative statute or a Court rule, it is certain the
58
Committee has no existing internal power to create such an immunity. 1
Assuming creation of an appropriate mechanism, and the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution, if the attorney still continues to refuse to
testify, the Rules could allow him to be held in contempt. But what
would be an appropriate penalty: Indefinite imprisonment? Fine? Disbarment?
51.

The Clark Committee recommended such a procedure. See Clark Report, note I

supra, at 89-91. See alsoSTANDARDS, note I I supra, at 50.

denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978);
52. E.g.,
In Re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
Committee on Legal Ethics ofW. Va. State Bar v. Graziani, 200 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. 1973),
cert.
dented, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
53. Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 329 A.2d 1 (1974): Segretti
v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 544 P.2d 929, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793, (1976).
54. In Re March, 71 111.2d 382, 376 N.E.2d 213 (1978).
In Re Daley,
55. E.g., In Re Schwartz, 51 111.2d 334, 282 N.E.2d 688 (1972). See also
549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978).
56. Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee
on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (Jun. 15, 1979).
57. See Ciravolo v. The Fla. Bar, 361 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1978) (legislation necessary to
authorize the granting of immunity from criminal prosecution: only the Florida Supreme
Court can authorize disciplinary immunity).
58. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-532 (Repl. 1979) authorizes a prosecuting attorney to seek a
court order to compel a witness to testify and in return to grant immunity. Itdoes not
authorize the Executive Secretary or the Committee to seek a court order to compel the
accused to testify in a disciplinary hearing or trial and be immunized from criminal prosecution. See generally Hamners v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977).
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Confidentiality of Committee Investigation and Action

Rule XII, which was added in 1976, grants an absolute privilege to
"[a]ll communication, complaints, testimony and evidence filed with,
given to or given before the. . . [Committee] or to any of its employees."
The new rule also bars any action from being instituted against the complainants or Committee members or employees acting within the scope of
their duties. Such regulations, which are commonly included in disciplinary procedures, are designed to encourage citizens and clients to come
forward with information without risk of retaliatory civil or criminal lawsuits. ' The Rule has not been completely successful, since many persons
are unaware of it and because other kinds of threats may intimidate some
witnesses. 6 ' An additional problem grows out of the question of whether
the Arkansas Supreme Court or only the legislature has the power to give
the privilege.6' This issue is currently being considered in a federal court
suit brought by a disbarred attorney against the members of the Committee.

62

While Rule XII protects potential witnesses and complainants, the
Rules also guard the interests of the accused attorney. Rule III requires
the Committee to "keep confidential the activities and files of the commit59. The case law analyzing the validity ofsuch a privilege is contained in Annot., Libel
and Slander. Priilegein Connection wtih Proceedigs to Disbar or Discipline an Attomey, 77 A. L. R.2d
493 (1977). The Clark Committee recommended a rule providing for absolute immunity.
See Clark Report, note I supra, at 74-76. The STANDARDS call for absolute immunity from
civil liability for disciplinary officials and complainants as to all acts or communications
within the scope of the agency's official functions and duties. STANDARDS, note II supra, at

15, 47.
60. In at least one instance the Committee has brought charges against an attorney
who threatened witnesses at Committee hearings with physical violence. The Supreme
Court held the attorney in contempt, fined him $1,000 and publicly reprimanded him.
Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Montgomery, Supreme Court of Arkansas 77-301 (original action under Supreme Court Rule 17) (this case has not been published
in any reporter). Witnesses and complainants may be deterred by the risk of litigation
against them or other forms of harrassment. Interview with Ben Core, Member, Supreme
Court Committee on Professional Conduct, in Fort Smith (Aug. 9, 1979).
61. See Stone v. Rosen, 348 So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (complainant has an
absolute privilege):
Members of the legal profession are accorded rights and privileges not enjoyed by
the public at large; the acceptance of these carries with it certain responsibilities
and obligations to the general public. For the sake of maintaining the high standards of the profession and disciplining those who violate the Cannons of Legal
Ethics, one who elects to enjoy the status and benefits as a member of the legal
profession must give up certain rights or causes of action which, in this instance, is
the right to file an action against a complainant who lodges an unsuccessful complaint with the Grievance Committee of The Florida Bar.
Id at 389.
62. Dodrill v. Moorhead (E.D. Ark. LR-C-77-234) (This case is presently pending) (a
libel suit by a suspended attorney against the members of the Committee). The attorney's
libel suit against the newspapers was allowed to proceed in Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat
Publishing Committee, 265 Ark. 626, 590 S.W.2d 940 (1979) (ruling that the attorney was
not a public figure).
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tee." Until recently, the only exceptions to this principle arose when it
was necessary to divulge information for disbarment suit purposes, to notify complainants and accused lawyers of Committee action, or to use the
information as statistical data. The attorney also could grant access to
Committee records involving him by waiving his right to confidentiality. 63 The only data on Committee activities available to the public and
this author come from these exceptions, court actions brought by the
Committee, or suits by lawyers who seek readmission following voluntary
surrender of their licenses.
If the Committee votes to take no action against an accused attorney,
the public rightly is not informed that changes were made and dismissed.
If the Committee cautions or reprimands a lawyer, either with or without
a formal hearing, the Rules formerly provided that the complainant
could be informed that some type of disciplinary action had been taken.
This provision was recently questioned by a complainant who demanded
to know what particular action had been taken. Apparently bowing to the
persistence of the inquiry, 64 the Arkansas Supreme Court on February 19,
1979 amended the Rules to direct the Committee to notify the com65
plaining party of any specific sanction imposed.
If a charge against an attorney is substantial enough to merit a formal hearing, he may be tried under a procedure changed by the Supreme
Court in an unpublicized but potentially far-reaching amendment. Prior
to October 15, 1979, the public was not informed of any formal disciplinary hearing and was certainly not invited to observe. By its per curiam
order of that date, however, the Court provided another exception to the
confidentiality requirement: "Nevertheless, any proceeding at which the
testimony of witnesses is being taken under oath shall be open to the public." 66 This action, which was taken without the enthusiastic support of
the Committee, 67 leaves numerous questions unanswered. Will the Com63. The waiver provision was added in 1977. See Appendix A. The concern with confidentiality is further indicated by an internal Committee rule that requires communications

within the Committee to be clearly marked "Personal." Amended Rules of the Supreme
Court Committee on Professional Conduct, adopted June 14, 1969, Rule 7. See generally
Annot., Discovegy of lnspectlon of State Bar Records of Complathts Against or Investgations of Atorneys, 83 A.L.R.3d 777 (1978); Annot., Restrictlig Access to Records of Di ciplhna Proceedings
Against Attorneys, 83 A.L.R.3d 749 (1978). See also note 70 itfra.
64. Smith, Dr. Wagh t Fghtiig to the Finth, Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 30, 1979, at IB,
col. 2.
65. Rule IV, note 9 supra. Under the Court's per curiam order of February 19, 1980,
Records of Committee Sanctions resulting from formal or informal proceedings will be
maintained by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 267 Ark. __, 574 S.W.2d (Arkansas Cases)
xxxi (1979). See also note 70 infra.
66. Per Curiam Order, 266 Ark. _, (266 ARK. SuP. CT. ADV. Ri'Rs., Oct 15, 1979,
No. 11, Appendix following p. 732) (1979).
67. Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee
on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (Jun. 15, 1979). One modification allowed by some
states is to allow the attorney to request a public hearing. See Clark Report, note I supra, at
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mittee now publicize its formal hearings? Will depositions taken for disciplinary purposes be open to the public? Will the format of the hearings
be altered to reflect public access? If the hearing is open to the public,
must any private sanction that results be revealed to the public? While
the Supreme Court deserves praise for its attempt to focus public attention on the profession's self-discipline, a more comprehensive amendment
of the Rules would have dealt with other situations where the goal of
confidentiality must be balanced against the need of the courts and the
community to know about the Committee's activities.
One situation involving the rule of confidentiality arises when an attorney resigns under disciplinary pressure. From 1972 through 1978 only
seven disciplinary actions were brought in a court against Arkansas attorneys.68 During the same period fifteen lawyers gave up their licenses to
practice law, usually as a result of pending or threatened charges of misconduct." 9 The names of resigning attorneys are technically a part of the
public record, but they can only be obtained from the Clerk of the
Supreme Court and are not in any published material. Although the
identity of these attorneys is in the public domain, the fact that the names
generally are not known to the legal community or the public may allow
resigned attorneys to continue to practice. At a minimum, the Committee should notify local judges and bar associations when a lawyer is un138-142. The Standards call for public hearings in disciplinary matters once formal charges
have been made. STANDARDS, note II supra, at 59. Those standards also call for the elimination of a role by the trial court; disciplinary proceedings would go directly from disciplinary boards and committees to the Supreme Court. For states in which disciplinary
hearings are open to the public, see GUIDELINES, note II supra, at n.24.
68. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Sam Montgomery, 77-301
(original action in Supreme Court under Supreme Court Rule 17); Weems v. Supreme
Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 523 S.W.2d 900 (1975); Comm. on
Professional Conduct v. Guy fl. Jones, Sr., 256 Ark. 1106, 509 S.W.2d 294 (1974); Supreme
Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. John Norman Warnock, Ouachita County, Arkansas, Civ. 77-70; Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Bobbie Jean Barton,
Pulaski County, Arkansas, Civ. 76-983; Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v.
Louis Art Dodrill, Pulaski County, Arkansas, 74-1512. (See also In re Dodrill, 260 Ark. 223,
538 S.W.2d 549 (1976)); Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. William I. Purifoy, Ouachita County, Arkansas, Civ. 74-22. (Several of these cases have never been published in any official or unofficial reports.)
In those seven actions the Committee has retained outside counsel to represent it at the
trial court level or on appeal. Unfortunately, because of the unpleasant nature of disciplinary actions and the lower than customary hourly fees that the Committee has paid, it has
been unable to use the same outside attorneys in subsequent cases. The Committee has
publicly requested attorneys to make their services available to the Committee. Addenda,
12 ARK. LAW. 104 (1978).
69. The author acknowledges the assistance of Jimmy H. Hawkins, Clerk of the
Supreme Court of Arkansas, in his examination of the "black book" of attorneys who have
lost their licenses. Because all the circumstances of their resignation are not known and
because of the limited access to the records, in this article attorneys who have surrendered
their licenses will be referred to only by initials. In contrast, names will be used if (1) an
action were brought in trial court, or (2) the Supreme Court issued a formal opinion, either
on the disciplinary matter or on a subsequent petition for reinstatement.
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able to practice because of suspension, disbarment, or resignation. In
addition, the names of those resigning should be published in the official
Supreme Court Reports. Such publication would indicate to the Bar and
the public the activities and presence of the Committee.
A more difficult confidentiality problem arises when a lawyer has
been privately censured by the Committee. The type of violation, the
frequency of misconduct and the name of offenders who have received
sanctions directly from the Committee are known only to the Committee
and, in theory, to the Arkansas Supreme Court. A threshold policy consideration involves the question whether this information should be revealed. Should the community be acquainted with the fact that an
attorney has been disciplined? Should some intermediate form of public
reprimand be available? Publicizing the Committee's activities would
help educate clients about the resources available to protect them from
unethical practice. 70 At the same time, attorneys would be reminded that
violations of the Code do result in disciplinary actions.
Even without any significant rule changes, the data related to Committee action could be used more efficiently. For example, over the past
71
eight years, 89 letters of reprimand, reproval, or caution were issued.
With one exception, all of these letters are confidential, the access limited
to the Committee and the Arkansas Supreme Court. 72 Yet the Court apparently has not used the information, since it has failed to check with its
own Committee on Professional Conduct before making Supreme Court
appointments. 7: It would be ironic if the Court were appointing attorneys disciplined for ethical violations to the Board of Bar Examiners, the
Client Security Fund, or other Court committees.
One aspect of confidentiality relates directly to protection of clients.
On occasion, the executive secretary has sought and obtained court permission to notify all clients of a disbarred attorney of the status of that
attorney and to inform those clients that their personal files and records
70. The STANDARDs recommend that the Committee inform the public about "the
disposition of each matter in which public discipline has been imposed, a lawyer has been
transferred to or from disability inactive status, or a lawyer has been reinstated or readmitted." STANDARDS, note II supra, at 21. Editor's Note On February 19, 1980, the Supreme
Court made several modifications to Rule 111. Where the Committee votes to caution, reprove, or reprimand the attorney without a hearing and the attorney does not elect to have a
hearing, the Committee's findings and order will be entered in the public files of the Clerk of

the Supreme Court. A similar filing is authorized if the Committee acts following a formal
hearing. The Court, however, has specified that no public record need be made concerning
informal complaints upon which no action is taken. 267 Ark. -, 574 S.W.2d (Arkansas
Cases) xxxi (1979).

71.
72.
73.

SeeAppendix B.
Seenote 64 supra and the case there cited.
Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee

on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (Jun. 15, 1979).
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are available. 74 As a general rule, however, clients have not been informed of disciplinary action against their attorney. A helpful amendment to the Rules would give the executive secretary authority to contact
affected clients and, perhaps, even require the secretary to undertake such
75
notification as a means of protecting the public.
Another aspect of confidentiality is presented by the issue of publicity by the Committee. Although nothing in the Rules authorizes the
Committee to publicize its activities, the community must be aware of the
Committee's existence and powers if it is to carry out its duty to protect
the public. The Committee, however, has made virtually no attempt to
inform the public of its activities. After assisting the Arkansas Bar Foundation in publication of a pamphlet entitled "Complaints About Lawyers," the Committee failed to become involved in the distribution of the
booklet to attorneys. It may have reasoned that the type of person likely
to have ethical problems probably would not work to publicize the Committee. Brochures could be distributed to public tract racks such as those
in courthouses, post offices, and banks. Publicity related to the Committee could be carried on by the Client's Security Funds Committee. Another approach might be to include a copy of the pamphlet, along with a
summary of the Committee's activity over the previous year in the annual
license fee mailing from the Clerk of the Supreme Court to all attorneys.
This would remind practitioners of the existence, duties, and powers of
the Committee. The Committee could avoid reliance on individual attorneys for publicity, however, by undertaking public service advertising by
radio, newspaper, or other media.
The Committee has not considered any broad attempt to reach the
public. The primary reason is that the Committee feels that clients with
valid complaints against lawyers do find their way to the Committee, after receiving directions from the Governor's Office, the Attorney General's staff, prosecuting attorneys, legal service offices, or other
attorneys. 76 At present, however, no way exists of knowing whether all
valid complaints are being handled properly. If a person initially seeks
help from one or two sources and is not referred to the Committee, does
74. The Committee followed this practice in Supreme Court Comm. on Professional
Conduct v. Barton, Pulaski County, Arkansas, Circuit Court, Civ. 76-983. However, generally no attempt has been made to notify clients of suspension or disbarment of an attorney.
Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (Jun. 15, 1979).
75. For a comprehensive summary of the actions that a court should order a disbarred
or suspended attorney to take to protect his clients, see STANDARDS, note II supra, at 40-41.
See also Clark Report, note I supra, at 147-149.
76. Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee
on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (June 15, 1979). The Clark Committee recommended intensive efforts to educate the public and the profession concerning the work of
disciplinary agencies. See Clark Report, note I supra, at 143-146. See STANDARDS, note I1
supra, at 21.
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he give up? If the client has not lost money because of the attorney's
actions, but has been treated improperly in some other fashion, does he
seek assistance? In addition, in many instances the client may either benefit from the improper activities of the attorney or not be aware of any
misconduct.
The Committee has failed to make any concentrated efforts to conduct an advertising campaign within a certain geographical region to determine if publicity would affect the number of inquiries or complaints.
As a pilot project, the Committee might consider picking a specific area
and undertaking an extensive publicity operation over a two or three
month period. This effort might include media advertisement, speeches
to bar associations, talks with civic groups, and press reports concerning
the general functions of the Committee. Care must be taken not to suggest that the pilot region is somehow populated by a greater number of
unscrupulous attorneys than other portions of the state. Such a test program would allow the Committee to confirm its conception that existing
levels of publicity are adequate.

III.

GROUNDS AND SANCTIONS
A.

Grounds

Since 1837 the Arkansas Statutes have set out five grounds on which
77
an attorney can be removed or suspended from the practice of law:
1. Conviction of any felony or infamous crime;
2. Improper retention of a client's money;
3. Any malpractice, deceit or misdemeanor committed in a professional capacity;
4. Suffering from habitual drunkenness; and
5. Any ungentlemanly conduct in the practice of his profession.
In 1939 Rule I incorporated the canons of ethics of the ABA "as the standard of professional conduct of attorneys at law." Under Rule IX of the
1939 version, however, the Court recognized that "the rules adopted shall
not be deemed exclusive of, but as supplemental to, the statutes of ...
Arkansas." The Committee was explicitly given the option of proceeding
under either the Rules or existing legislation. Thus, both the canons and
the statutes delineated what constituted unprofessional and unethical
conduct. The Rules as adopted in 1969 retained the apparent option suggested by Rule IX but amended Rule I to list four of the historic statutory
grounds in addition to retaining the referenced ABA canons. Only "ungentlemanly conduct" was not specifically included. The 1976 version of
the Rules made two significant changes that further complicate the problem of determining what conduct warrants disciplinary action.
77.

ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-401 (Repl. 1962).

588

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:571

As amended in 1976 Rule I deletes any explicit reference to the statutory grounds enumerated in the 1969 Rules. Rule I "adopts the Code of
Professional Responsibility. . .as the standard of professional conduct of
attorneys at law." One defect exists in the present wording of Rule I.
The Code is not adopted as of a specific date nor is any account taken of
continual revision of the Code by the ABA. If the Arkansas Supreme
Court fails to accept or further modifies changes made in the national
Code, a problem may develop as to which "Code" controls under the
Rules. 78 A simple solution would be to amend Rule I so that it refers to
the "Code of Professional Responsibility as proposed by the American
Bar Association and as adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court."
Rule IX was also altered in 1976. Although the statement that the
Rules are supplemental to the statutes was retained, the section explicitly
authorizing the Committee to proceed under either the statutes or the
Rules was stricken. The intended effect of this change may have been to
ensure that the Committee follow the procedures set out in the Rules
rather than rely on the statutes. It should be noted, however, that prior to
1976 the Committee based its charges on both the ABA Code and the
Arkansas statutory grounds. 79 Similarly, in affirming a three year suspension of a lawyer's right to practice, the Supreme Court cited both the
statutes and the Code.8 0
The relationship between statutes governing various areas of the
practice of law and the overlapping Court Rules is an issue which the
Court addressed in two recent cases. In discussing the right of a nonresident attorney to practice law in a state court, the Supreme Court emphasized that amendment 28 eliminates "fof all time any possible question about the power of the Court to regulate the practice of law." 1 The
adoption of the amendment does not, however, invalidate every legislative act dealing with the same subject, particularly where the statute was
passed before 1938 and is not in "irreconcilable conflict" with Court rules.
The Court appears willing to recognize and apply statutes that are not
necessarily inconsistent with the Court Rules and do not hinder or interfere with judicial powers. In a matter involving admission to practice, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that where a direct conflict exists between a
78. For instance, in its adoption of rules regulating advertising, the Arkansas Supreme
Court went further than the ABA's recommendation. Per Curiam Order, 263 Ark. 948, 569
S.W.2d (Arkansas Cases) xviii (1979). See footnote 13 to OrehninaqvMote accompanying THE
ARKANSAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, pages 606-608, this issue.
79. See, e.g., Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Dodrill, Circuit Court Pulaski County,
Civ. 74-1512 (complaint).
80. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 679, 682,
583 S.W.2d 900, 903, 905 (1975).
81. McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 341, 500 S.W.2d 357, 364 (1973).
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court rule and a legislative statute, the rule controls.8 2 Although that case
involved the requirement of a law school education as a prerequisite for
the practice of law in Arkansas, the Court previously had reached a similar conclusion in a disciplinary matter.8 3 Based on this conclusion, the
Court should consider a modification to specify that the Rules are the
exclusive source of disciplinary procedures in Arkansas. Such a simple
step would avoid unnecessary confusion.
Absent such a change, the possibility presently exists that an action
might be brought under the statute for habitual drunkenness or ungentlemanly conduct. These are two primary situations covered by statute but
which are not explicitly dealt with by the Code or the Rules. Rule XI
provides that an attorney who is found mentally deficient by a court of
competent jurisdiction may lose his license to practice law. Such a regulation could be expanded to deal with a person having problems with alcohol who is unable to carry on his professional work.8 4 The
"ungentlemanly conduct" standard may be unconstitutionally vague, but
provisions of the
that ground has never been invoked and the 8catch-all
5
unnecessary.
ground
statutory
the
Code make
The basic workload of the Committee does not usually involve such
charges, for the majority of the complaints pursued concern misuse of the
client's funds.86 Yet in the past decade the Committee has proceeded
against attorneys for public drunkenness,8 7 shoplifting in a supermarket, 88 mental incompetency, 8 9 professional incomfipetency, 9° bribery of a
82. Petition of Pitchford, 265 Ark. 752, 581 S.W.2d 321, cert. deniedsub nom. Pitchford v.
Supreme Court of Arkansas, 100 S. Ct. 131, reh. denied, 100 S. Ct. 472 (1979).
83. Armitage v. Bar Rules Comm., 223 Ark. 465, 266 S.W.2d 818 (1954).
84. See generally Clark Report, note 1 supra, at 110-115. As an additional sanction, the
STANDARDS suggest probation-where the attorney can provide legal services, but only
under supervision-as appropriate in cases of minor or temporary disability. STANDARDS,
note 10 supra, at 37. See, e.g., In Re Varnes, 285 Or. 463, 591 P.2d 366 (1979) (probation).
85. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(6): A lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Code of Professional Responsibility as
adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court. See THE ARKANSAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY,

page 616, this issue.

86. The problem was emphasized recently in a mailing by the Arkansas Bar Association to its members reviewing the ethical rules in handling clients' funds and advising attorneys to create escrow accounts. Letter from Professional Ethics and Grievances Committee,
to members of the Arkansas Bar Association, July 17, 1979. Unlike other states, Arkansas
has no specific rule requiring that attorneys keep accurate records of clients' funds in their
possession and have the records audited. The majority of inquiries received by the Committee involve procrastination, negligence and delay. Letter from Taylor Roberts to Howard
W. Brill (November 16, 1979). Of those pursued toward possible disbarment, a majority
involve misuse of clients' funds.
87. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Barton, Pulaski County, Arkansas, Civ. 76-983.
88. Petition of R.A.D. to the Supreme Court. See note 69 supra.
89. Petition of E.R.M. Id
90. Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court Com-
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witness, 9 1 threats against a witness, 9 2 solicitation, 9 3 and tax violations. 9 4
A final area of possible conflict between the Rules and the statutes
exists with respect to conduct of an attorney unrelated to the practice of
law. Must an attorney be acting in his professional capacity to be punished for unethical conduct? The Court has concluded that misconduct
of an attorney that is neither connected with professional activities nor
impairs his ability to represent a client will nevertheless afford a basis for
disciplinary action. 95 Such a result might not be justified just by looking
at the statutes, but is certainly supported by an examination of the
96
Code.
In addition to the ethical standards of the Code incorporated in Rule
I, Rule X sets out three specific situations that can lead to disciplinary
action: 1) disbarment from the practice of law in any other state; 2) disbarment or suspension by any court of record outside of Arkansas or any
federal court within Arkansas; and 3) conviction of a felony or infamous
crime under the laws of any state or the United States. For historical and
occasionally incomprehensible reasons these three cases are treated differently.
Rule X states that "[tihe disbarment of any person from the practice
of law in any other state shall operate as a disbarment of any person from
the practice of law in this state. ' ' 9 7 Under the wording of this section, a
showing of disbarment in any state leads to disbarment in Arkansas. The
real difficulty comes in determining which of the 3826 attorneys admitted
in Arkansas may have been disbarred elsewhere. 98 The National Center
for Professional Responsibility, an arm of the American Bar Association,
does maintain a data bank that includes the names of all lawyers who
mittee on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (Jun. 15, 1979). See, e.g., In re Chapman, 69
I1l. 2d 494, 373 N.E.2d 675 (1978); In re Taylor, 66 I11.
2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845 (1977).
91. Petition of Wayne R. Williams, 265 Ark. 480 (1979).
92. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Montgomery, 77-301, (original
action under Supreme Court Rule 17) (threatening a witness at a Committee hearing). See
note 60 supra.
93. Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (Jun. 15, 1979). In one instance the Committee was on the verge of filing solicitation charges against a legal aid attorney, but at the
last minute the action was dropped when the decision in In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978)
was announced. Interview with Ben Core, Member, Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, in Fort Smith, August 9, 1979.
94. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Jones, 256 Ark. 1106, 509
S.W.2d 294 (1974). The Court ruled that willfully filing false and fraudulent tax returns
does involve "moral turpitude."
95. Id. at 1107, 509 S.W.2d at 295.
96.

See note 85 supra.

97. The rule also bars persons from being admitted in Arkansas if they have been
previously disbarred elsewhere.
98. Of those admitted to practice in Arkansas, 650 were non-residents of Arkansas as of
December 31, 1978. Letter from Jimmy H. Hawkins, Clerk, Supreme Court of Arkansas, to
Howard W. Brill (Sep. 7, 1979).
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have been publicly disciplined in the fifty states, the territories, the federal
court system, or by administrative agencies. That list is distributed quarterly to the State Board of Bar Examiners, the Arkansas Supreme Court
and the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct. 99 Yet no
mechanism exists for checking the list of disciplined attorneys against the
list of licensed attorneys in Arkansas.100 Thus it is conceivable that there
are lawyers who have been disbarred elsewhere but who are still practicing in Arkansas. Staffing should be provided to the Committee to make
this cross check.
Another section of Rule X provides that if an Arkansas attorney is
disbarred or suspended by any court of record outside of Arkansas or any
federal court in Arkansas, that judgment shall be primafacie ground for
disbarment or suspension in Arkansas. The differences between this section and the one discussed in the preceding paragraph are significant.
Disbarment or suspension by a court of record, as distinguished from disbarment in an entire state, simply establishes a primafacie case for similar
action in Arkansas. The actual question of punishment, however, is still
an issue. By establishing just cause for his activities, the affected attorney
can argue that some milder form of discipline should be applied in Arkansas. Several other observations about this part of Rule X should be noted.
This part covers both disbarment and suspension and appears to have a
broader range than the first portion of Rule X. But why should the scope
of the second provision be limited to disbarment and suspension? It
might be profitable to the profession if any disciplinary action, either publicly or privately administered, taken by a court of record against an Arkansas attorney, were made a part of that individual's Arkansas record to
be considered by the Committee. In addition, the possibility exists that
an attorney threatened with discipline by another court might simply resign from that bar, return his license, and then, without any formal disciplinary record, be able to continue practice in Arkansas. Considering the
relative frequency with which voluntary resignation occurs in Arkansas,
some system should be created to identify cases where a license is given up
as a result of official pressure. With one exception, no official action has
ever been taken based upon reciprocal enforcement. 10 1
The third portion of Rule X was added in 1976, two years after the
Committee's most prominent case. Former State Senator Guy H.
99. Interview with Marcia L. Proctor, National Center for Professional Responsibility,
in Chicago (Apr. 23, 1979).
100. Indeed the Committee has not even received the list. Letter from Taylor Roberts
to Howard W. Brill (November 16, 1979).
101. Interview with Ben Core, Member, Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Conduct, in Fort Smith (Aug. 9, 1979).
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("Mutt") Jones, Sr. 10 2 was convicted by a federal district court in the
Eastern District of Arkansas of four counts of income tax evasion in December 1972. In April, 1973, he was sentenced to three years probation
and fined $5,000. Pursuant to a local federal rule, his name was struck
from the list of attorneys admitted to federal practice in that district.
Twelve months later, the federal trial court refused to reinstate him to
federal practice. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however,
remanded the case, finding that the local rule violated due process because no opportunity was allowed to present mitigating evidence on the
petition for reinstatement. 103
Following the federal conviction for income tax evasion and the federal disbarment, the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Conduct moved against Senator Jones in June, 1973, in an original
Supreme Court action.' 0 4 The Committee proceeded under the section of
Rule X that provided that the federal disbarment constituted primafacze
grounds for disbarment or suspension in Arkansas. Senator Jones did argue that unique and extenuating circumstances existed and that he
should be allowed to present evidence to support a sanction other than
disbarment. The Court refused to let him offer any facts relating to matters adjudicated in the income tax evasion case. He was free, however, to
offer evidence relevant to the issue of mitigation.10 5 The Court named a
Batesville attorney as master to take testimony in a public hearing in
which both sides would be represented by counsel and would have full
rights of examination.
In May, 1974, seventeen months after his conviction for tax evasion,
the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled on the merits in the case of Senator
Jones.' 0 6 The Court reaffirmed its unwillingness to review the evidence
upon which the defendant was found guilty of tax evasion or his contention that the convictions were politically motivated. It concluded that the
crime of willfully and knowingly evading taxes by filing false or fraudulent tax returns involves moral turpitude. In addition, the Court found
that disciplinary action may be based upon misconduct that is not connected with the professional activities of an attorney and results in no
10 7
harm to his clients.
Although disciplinary action was justified against Senator Jones, the
102. Set Reaves v. Jones, 257 Ark. 210, 515 S.W.2d 201 (1974) (expulsion from Arkansas
State Senate upheld).

103. Jones v. United States, 506 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1974).
104. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Jones, 255 Ark. 1069, 499
S.W.2d 619 (1973).
105. Id
106. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Jones, 256 Ark. 1106, 509
S.W.2d 294 (1974). This opinion was issued three weeks after the federal trial court refused
to reinstate Jones, but six months prior to the decision of the Eighth Circuit.
107. Id. at 1107, 509 S.W.2d at 295.
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Arkansas Supreme Court refused to disbar him. His age, prior professional conduct without substantial blemish, service as a legislator, able
representation of his clients, and "high regard for the law" constituted
good cause for invoking a lesser punishment. The Court held that he
should be suspended for one year and then automatically be reinstated.
"[W]e believe the interest of the public in the legal profession would be
adequately served by a temporary revocation of his license to practice
law.' ' 0 8 The decision is noteworthy for four reasons. The Committee on
Professional Conduct was ordered to pay the cost of its own brief, rather
than having the losing party pay. Second, in contrast with other attorneys disciplined, 10 9 Senator Jones was to be fully and automatically reinstated upon the expiration of the one year period. Third, during the
seventeen month period between his federal conviction and his Arkansas
revocation, Senator Jones apparently continued to practice.' 10 Certain
commentators have criticized a disciplinary system that allows a felon to
practice even for a time and have called for a rule that provides an immediate interim suspension pending a final determination by the Committee
or a court. Fourth, and most significant, the degree of the penalty was
mild in light of the sanctions imposed on other attorneys in ArkansasIII
and throughout the nation who have been convicted of income tax eva1ion.112
This opinion marks the low point in the Court's handling of disciplinary matters.
Followingjones the Supreme Court added a third provision to Rule
X: "If an attorney has been convicted of a felony or infamous crime
under the laws of any State or the United States, a charge may be made
. . . by the Committee."'' 13 The judgment of conviction shall be conclu108.
109.

Id
See the material accompanying notes 151-157 infia.

110. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Jones, 256 Ark. 1106, 1107, 509
S.W.2d 294, 295 (1974): "IT]he license of...
Jones . . . to practice law in the State of
Arkansas is . . . revoked for a period of one year, during which he shall not, in any way,
directly, or indirectly, engage in the practice of law, in any respect, form or fashion. Respondent shall have 30 days from this date within to arrange for the handling of all pending
legal business in which he has been employed." Id. (emphasis added). For comments, see
note 113 infra.
11.
See the material accompanying notes 130-134 in/ra.
112. See In re Lacob, 50 11. 2d 277, 278 N.E.2d 795 (1972) (two year suspension); In re
Shavin, 40 II1. 2d 254, 239 N.E.2d 790 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1019 (1969) (two year
suspension); Comm. on Professional Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Pieters,
241 N.W.2d I (Iowa 1976) (indefinite suspension); Maryland State Ass'n v. Agnew, 318 A.2d
811 (Md. 1974) (disbarment); In re Kueter, 501 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1973) (indefinite suspension); In re Kline, 156 Mont. 177, 477 P.2d 881 (1970) (indefinite suspension); In re Turco,

66 N.J. 50, 327 A.2d 668 (1974) (disbarment); Stark County Bar Ass'n v.
St. 2d 455, 349 N.E.2d 300 (1976) (indefinite suspension); Dayton Bar
Ohio St. 2d 342, 348 N.E.2d 707 (1976) (indefinite suspension); State Bd.
v. Holland, 494 P.2d 196 (Wyo. 1972) (one year suspension; four years'

Bernabei, 46 Ohio
Ass'n v. Kern, 46
of Law Examiners

probation).
113. Rule X, note 9 supra. The Clark Report recommended immediate suspension, pending the appeal of an attorney convicted of a serious crime, until final disposition of a discipli-
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sive evidence of his guilt in the disciplinary proceeding. The only issue to
be decided is the extent of the disciplinary action warranted by the misconduct. Consistent with the principles of collateral estoppel and the
higher standard of proof required in criminal proceedings as opposed to
disciplinary proceedings,1t 4 the attorney is barred from offering any evidence inconsistent with the essential elements of the crime for which he
was convicted. To some extent, this is the method followed in the Jones
case: The underlying judgment cannot be challenged. Only an opportu15
nity to question the extent of the discipline is provided.'
The new section, however, appears to modify the procedure used in
Jlones. While the Committee proceeded against Jones in the Arkansas
Supreme Court, this new provision suggests the action must be brought in
a state trial court with an appeal to the Supreme Court. It is unclear why
this proceeding must be commenced in the trial court when a suit brought
under Rule X and based upon disbarment or suspension by a court of
record is instituted at the Supreme Court level. Both parts of Rule X
allow the attorney to show good causejustifying a lesser punishment. The
possibility of testimony exists under either provision. Logically both actions should be brought at the same level. Regardless of whether an attorney has been disbarred, suspended or convicted, the best protection for
the public and the fairest approach to the attorney will be a speedy conclusion of the matter. Such a result is more likely to be achieved by having the case originate with the Supreme Court. Requiring the Supreme
Court to deal with these situations establishes a uniform approach and
focuses public attention on the disciplinary system.
nary proceeding based on the conviction. See Clark Report, note I supra, at 122-130. "No
single facet of disciplinary enforcement is more to blame for any lack of public confidence in
the integrity of the bar than the policy that permits a convicted attorney to continue to
practice while apparently enjoying immunity from discipline." Id. at 124. See The Fla. Bar
v. Prior, 330 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1976) (immediate suspension upheld while attorney pursued
appeals from the federal criminal convictions).
See also Theis v. Joint Bar Ass'n Grievance Comm. for Second and Eleventh Judicial
Districts, 45 N.Y.2d 924, 383 N.E.2d 877, 411 N.Y.S.2d 231, (1978), appealdsmised, 99 S. Ct.
555 (1979) (federal felony conviction for bruising the thumb of a federal agent resulted in

automatic disbarment in New York). See 65 ABA J. 690, 899 (1979). See also STANDARDS,
note 11 supra, at 35.

114. See generall R. CASAD, RES JUDICATA 255-258 (1976). Nothing in the Rules requires the Committee to delay an investigation, a hearing or a court proceeding because the
attorney is involved in a criminal defense on basically the same charges. The Committee
has apparently adopted a policy of waiting until criminal charges are resolved. Such an
approach is generally consistent with the recommendation of the Clark Report, note I supra,
at 82-85. Even though an attorney is acquitted of criminal charges, the different standard of
proof in a disciplinary hearing still permits charges to be brought in that tribunal.
115. See The Fla. Bar v. Craig, 238 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1970); STANDARDS, note II supra, at

71-72.
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B. Sanctions
Once grounds for discipline are established, a sanction must be imposed. A lack of flexibility in the type of possible penalties, however,
makes the Rules weak in this area. The Committee may (1) dismiss an
action, (2) caution or reprimand an attorney, and (3) seek action by a
court.'

16

Under Rule V, a court is explicitly authorized to "reprove, rep-

rimand, suspend, or disbar" a defendant attorney.' 7 In practice judges
and chancellors have shown a willingness to expand the scope of specified
sanctions. One trial court suspended an attorney for three years and then
required him to submit an application to the State Board of Examiners
for readmission.' t8 Another lawyer was ordered to pay court reporter fees
when evidence was presented at a judicial hearing." 9 The holding in a
recent case also indicates that the trial judge may approve variations of
the penalties listed in the Rules. The trial judge not only suspended the
attorney for 12 months, as he was entitled to do, but also conditioned the
20
offender's reinstatement upon the taking and passing of the bar exam.'
In another case, the Supreme Court pointed out with apparent approval
that the attorney had reimbursed his clients for funds that had been misused.' 21 A specific power of restitution should be granted to the Committee and the courts. 122 The Rules should be modified to reflect the
flexibility trial courts are exhibiting in fitting the punishment to the circumstances of the particular case.
One desirable sanction has recently been added to the Rules. Under
116. Rule IV, note 9 supra.
117. Rule V, note 9 supra. Since February, 1979, the Committee has not had the power
to reprove an attorney, but the trial judge retains that power. It is uncertain whether this
distinction is intentional or indicates less than careful draftsmanship in the February, 1979
amendment.
118. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Weems, 257 Ark. 673, 523
S.W.2d 900 (1975).
119. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Jones, 256 Ark. 1106, 509
S.W.2d 294 (1974). The Court did direct each side to pay the costs of its own briefs. The
Committee has not made a practice of attempting to recover court costs from attorneys.
Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (Jun. 15, 1979). In contrast, the disciplinary rules of the
Florida Supreme Court provide that costs assessed against a disciplined attorney "shall include court reporters' fees, copy costs, witness fees and traveling expenses, and reasonable
traveling and out-of-pocket expenses of the referee and bar counsel, if any." Integration Rule of
the Florda Bar, Article XI, Rule /l.06(9)(a), FLA. B.J. 35 (Sept. 1979).

The STANDARDS

would allow a court to require the respondent to pay the costs of the proceedings. STANDARDS, note I I supra, at 42. They would not, however, authorize the Committee to require
the disciplined attorney to pay a portion of the hearing costs, Since so few cases are taken to
court, the question of the hearing costs is more significant in Arkansas.
120. In Re Dodrill, 260 Ark. 223, 538 S.W.2d 549 (1976).
121. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 523
S.W.2d 900 (1975).
122. See Annot., Power of Court to Order Restitution to Wronged Client in Disciplina Proceedings Agabist Atorney, 175 A.L.R.3d 307 (1977). See also STANDARDS, note II supra, at 42.
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Rule IV the attorney may, with the consent of the Supreme Court, voluntarily surrender his license upon conditions agreed to by the Committee
and by the attorney. The requirement of Supreme Court approval may
dissuade a lawyer who has given up his license from seeking readmission
because his case was not heard by a court or the Committee. A Committee investigation must precede any Supreme Court action on the lawyer's
petition for voluntary surrender.' 23 Before agreeing to the voluntary surrender of a license, the Committee has in recent years demanded that the
attorney sign a statement containing the facts of the case and admitting
24
his involvement. 1

Other disciplinary options should be considered for inclusion in the
Rules. Presently the Committee must choose between unpublicized Committee action and commencing a suit in court. An alternative would be to
grant the Committee the power to issue public reprimands. Such a sanction would be appropriate for violations which, though serious, still do
not merit suspension or disbarment. Recently the Supreme Court
adopted a form of public reprimand with its order regarding attorneys
who are tardy in filing notices of appeal in criminal cases.1 25 Other sanctions that may be imposed less frequently, but which still should be available to the Committee and the courts, include the following: 1) the
imposition of court costs upon a disciplined attorney,' 126 2) an imposition
of a probationary period, 127 and 3) immediate suspension following a
criminal conviction pending a hearing on an appropriate sanction.128
The suggestion has been made that the Committee should be authorized to issue advisory opinions, either upon request of an attorney or in
the form of a general warning to the Bar. Presently, with the exception of
the limited efforts of the Ethics and Grievance Section of the Arkansas
Bar Association, no agency or office exists to provide ethical guidance to
Arkansas attorneys. Although such a service is needed, the Committee
cannot reasonably provide such a service without a change in staffing.
Although such a unified approach would have certain beneifts, it may not
be advisable to have the agency responsible for discipline issuing advisory
123. Rule XT, note 9 supra.
124. The rapid voluntary surrender of a license with a possible subsequent readmission
petition to the Court, as a means of avoiding Committee investigation, was used in at least
one instance in the early 1970's and led to this change in the rules. Interview with Ben Core,
Member, Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, in Fort Smith (Aug. 9, 1979).
See also Clark Report, note I supra, at 101-10 (recommending that the resignation of an attorney be accepted only if the attorney acknowledges in writing that the material facts on
which the pending misconduct complaint is predicated are true).
125. Per Curiam Order, 265 Ark. __ 574 S.W.2d (Arkansas cases) xxx (1979) (265 ARK.
SuP. CT. ADV. RPTRS., Feb. 5, 1979, No. 1, Appendix). (February 5, 1979). See Editor's
note at note 70 supra.
126. See note 119 supra.
127. See note 84 supra.
128. See note 113 supra.
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One final concern with sanctions involves the leniency and inconsistency the Supreme Court has occasionally displayed in its handling of
disciplinary cases. 13 In addition to three cases decided by 4-3 decision, 13 ' the problem is best illustrated by a comparison of theJones132 and
Weems 133 cases. Senator Jones was convicted of four counts of federal
income tax evasion, and the Supreme Court suspended him for one year
and ruled that his license would be automatically reinstated. Weems, on
the other hand, was not convicted of any crime, but he had violated the
Code by misusing the funds of three clients before repaying them. He was
suspended for three years and required to establish his fitness to practice
law before he could be reinstated. Unless there are other factors that do
not appear in the opinions, it seems that the Court may have altered its
standards after the Jones decision. Is Senator Jones entitled to lighter
sanctions because his activities did not involve clients, because he is a
former state senator as opposed to a prosecuting attorney, or because he is
older? Are these the type of factors that the Court is going to consider?
In fairness, however, the Jones case was the first formal opinion by the
Court on disciplinary matters in a decade. Developments since that decision suggest that the Court has become slightly less generous toward erring attorneys and more concerned with protecting the public and the
system of justice. The danger of potentially arbitrary and inconsistent
sanctions would be reduced if the Rules included a provision directing the
Committee and the courts to consider aggravating and mitigating circuma4
stances in the determination of proper discipline.
129. The newly created Supreme Court Committee on Unauthorized Practice does
have the authority to issue advisory opinions as well as initiate lawsuits. Per Curiam Order,
264 Ark. 960 (1978).
130. "[T]he problem the Committee, at the time I was a member, felt the strongest
about [was] the failure of the courts to show strength and firmness in determining the punishment and discipline in disbarment cases." Solomon, Trials and Tribulations of a Member of
the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, 12 ARK. LAW. 76-77 (1978).
131. In Re Wayne R. Williams, 265 Ark. 480, (1979); In Re Richard H. Mays, Per
Curiam Order of October 16, 1978 (This order was filed on Oct. 16, 1978 with the Arkansas
Supreme Court. The order, however, does not appear in any of the published official or
unofficial reports.); Ex Parte Barton, 237 Ark. 454, 373 S.W.2d 411 (1963). Dissenting justices in these cases demanded harsher penalties.
132. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Jones, 256 Ark. 1106, 509
S.W.2d 294 (1974).
133. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 523
S.W.2d 900 (1975).
134. In imposing discipline, the STANDARDS suggests that the Court or the Committee
consider aggravating facts, such as the lack of remorse, the failure to acknowledge the seriousness of the violation, the failure to cooperate with the investigation, the failure to voluntarily make restitution the extent of the ethical violations, and the attorney's prior
disciplinary record. As examples of possible mitigating circumstances, the STANDARDS mention inexperience, contrition, restitution without Committee pressure, a willingness to rectify
damage and mental difficulties. STANDARDS, note I I supra, at 44-45. See also Weems v.
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Trial Court Action and Appellate Review

When a disciplinary action is taken to a court, the Rules provide for
a non-jury trial before either a circuit judge or chancellor. "35 The possibility of a jury trial still exists nonetheless because of ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-411.t36 In 1954, however, when an attorney did request a jury, the
trial court refused, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
older legislative act was superceded by the Rules.' 37 Although such a
result is consistent with the approach taken in other jurisdictions, 38 the
Supreme Court again faced Rule IX which provides that the Rules are
supplemental to the statutes. This is another example of the less than
ideal draftsmanship of the Rules. In a number of cases,' 39 the Supreme
Court has emphasized that the statutes are merely supplemental to the
Rules. The solution to this problem is simple. Either the legislature
should repeal all of chapter 25140 or the Supreme Court should overrule
those laws in light of amendment 28.
If a case is brought before the Committee, Rule IV provides that a
sanction cannot be imposed unless "there is reasonable ground to believe
that the attorney has been guilty of professional misconduct." If a complaint reaches a state court, the standard of proof differs from the one
applied by the Committee in its deliberations. The Supreme Court had
previously established the burden of proof for disciplinary suits:
[It] has been held by this court that proceedings for disbarment of an
attorney are not criminal but civil in their nature, and as such are governed by the rules applicable to all civil actions, and hence it is required
that the material allegations in such cases be established only by a preponderance of the evidence, and not beyond a reasonable doubt. 141
In accord with a minority of jurisdictions,'

42

the Court recently reaf-

Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 685-B, 523 S.W. 2d 900, 907
(1975) (supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing).
135. Rule IV, note 9 supra.
136. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-411 (Repl. 1962).
137. Armitage v. Bar Rules Comm., 223 Ark. 465, 266 S.W.2d 818 (1954).
138. Smith v. Board ofCom'rs of Ala. State Bar, 284 Ala. 420, 225 So.2d 829 (1969); In
Re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76 (Alaska 1974); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Brown, 291 So. 2d
385 (La. 1974).
139. See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
140. The five chapters of Title 25 of the Arkansas Statutes cover five topics: admission
to practice; illegal admission and unauthorized practice; rights and liabilities; suspension
and disbarment; county law library. The first, second and fourth chapters overlap considerably with the Rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
141. Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm. of the State of Arkansas, 202 Ark. 1101, 1110, 155
S.W.2d 697, 701 (1941). Also emphasizing the civil nature of the disciplinary proceedings is
In Re Dodrill, 260 Ark. 223, 538 S.W.2d 549 (1976).
142. See e.g., In re Posler, 390 Mich. 581, 213 N.W.2d 133 (1973); Feola v. New York
State Bar Ass'n, 37 A.D.2d 789, 324 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1971); Application of Balch, 506 P.2d
1384 (Okla. 1973). Compare Greenbaum v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 893, 544 P.2d 921, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 785 (1976) (convincing proof to a reasonable certainty); The Fla. Bar v. Abney, 279

So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1973) (clear and convincing evidence); In Re Campbell, 95 Idaho 87, 502
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firmed that this civil burden of proof is applicable to actions arising from
143
the Rules.
Either the Committee or the defendant attorney is free to appeal
from a trial court decision to the Supreme Court. 144 Rule V specifically
states that the matter shall be heard de novo. This hearing is based on the
record compiled by the trial judge. The notice of appeal and the perfection of appeal follow the standard rules for civil appeals, 14 5 with one significant deviation. Rule VI indicates that the order of the circuit judge or
chancellor shall remain effective until there is a judgment from the
Supreme Court. Where attorneys have been prohibited from practice by
the trial court, it is unclear whether those attorneys have actually ceased
practice during the period of appeal. The Committee has appealed, in
some cases, asking for a harsher penalty, but it has never appealed from
an adverse trial decision.146
The question of how broad the de noo review should be was raised in
Weems. 14 7 There the attorney argued that Rule V required the Supreme
Court to "make independent findings of fact, drawing its own conclusions
from the evidence."' 48 The defendant argued that the findings of the
lower court would only be important where a conflict in the facts existed
which could only be resolved by reference to the "demeanor and creditibility"' 49 of the witnesses. Rejecting this contention the Supreme Court
relied on the rationale in Hurst v. Bar Rules Committee of the State of Arkansas.'15 0 In that case the Court approved the admission of the record of the
Committee proceedings as evidence in the Supreme Court review. The
hearsay objection to this Committee material was overruled. The Court
treated the disciplinary hearing as an action brought before an administrative agency where factual issues are sifted by a body of experienced,
P.2d 1100 (1972) (clear and undoubted preponderance of evidence); State v. Stumpf, 53
Wis. 2d 690, 193 N.W.2d 842 (1972) (clear and satisfactory evidence). The STANDARDS call
for clear and convincing evidence. See STANDARDS, note II supra, at 65. For a partial list of
the jurisdictions, see GUIDELINES, note 11 supra, at 12.
143. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Profesional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 680, 523
S.W.2d 900, 904 (1975).
144. Rules V and VI, note 9 supra. With the creation of the Arkansas Court of Appeals,
disciplinary matters will continue to be appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 29.
145. Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure 1-8. The failure to appeal an order of suspension bars the attorney from subsequently asserting that the trial judge lacked the power
to place conditions on the suspension. In Re Dodrill, 260 Ark. 223, 538 S.W.2d 549 (1976).
146. Interview with Taylor Roberts, Executive Secretary, Supreme Court Committee
on Professional Conduct, in Little Rock (Jun. 15, 1979).
147. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 523
S.W.2d 900 (1975).
148. Id at 680, 523 S.W.2d at 904.
149. Id.
150. 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W.2d 697 (1941).
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highly qualified professionals.' 5 ' After considering all evidence the
Supreme Court adopted the trial judge's findings of fact. The decision to
use the lower court's factual findings was based on 1)the civil burden of
proof standard applicable to disciplinary hearings, and 2) on a feeling
that "in view of the present Rules of procedures relating to disbarment,
this court on appeal should give even greater weight to the findings of the
lower tribunal."' 152 Hurst and Weems raise some doubt concerning the
scope of de novo review in disciplinary matters before the Arkansas
Supreme Court.
D.

Reinstatement

The Rules do not cover reinstatement, except where an attorney is
suspended for failure to pay the annual license fee. 153 In Ex Parte BarIon 1 5 4 an attorney petitioned the Court for readmission fourteen months
after she had been suspended for three years. Although the Bar Rules
Committee opposed reinstatement, the Court concluded that her repayment of money combined with the fact that further punishment appeared
to serve no useful purpose, justified reinstatement. The dissent argued
that "the right to practice law should be considered on the same basis as
that of paroles and pardons,'""" and that three reasons dictated a refusal
of the petition: 1) the Bar Rules Committee still opposed reinstatement,
2) the trial judge had said nothing about reinstatement, and 3) no members of the Bar had supported any recommendations of the affidavit. The
dissenters suggested that the majority was simply saying that a three year
sentence was too harsh.
In In Re Dodri/, 5 decided in 1976, the Supreme Court affirmed by
implication the power of the trial judge to suspend an attorney and require that the Bar exam be taken again before reinstatement. In contrast,
Sam Weems apparently did not have to take the exam, and Senator Jones
was reinstated automatically without having to take the exam or show
any type of fitness. The chronology of these cases suggests that in the last
few years, the Court has been more reluctant to automatically reinstate a
suspended attorney.
Another case involving reinstatement is that of Wayne Williams,
who voluntarily surrendered his license in 1976 after admitting that he
151. Se also Armitage v. Bar Rules Comm., 223 Ark. 465, 266 S.W.2d 818 (1954).
152. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 680, 523
S.W.2d 900, 904 (1975).
153. Rule X serves as an example of the need for reorganization of the rules. This
particular rule covers everything from the necessity of being a member of the bar and paying annual license fees, through the procedure for disbarment, to the three instances of automatic discipline. Rule X, note 9 supra.
154. 237 Ark. 454, 373 S.W.2d 411 (1963).
155. Id at 456, 373 S.W.2d at 412.
156. 260 Ark. 223, 538 S.W.2d 549 (1976).
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had tried to obtain a higher legal fee on the pretense of having to bribe a
prosecuting attorney. The voluntary surrender of his license was accepted
by the Court, with the provision that he could reapply for admission after
two years and a satisfactory showing to the Board of Bar Examiners that
his character and integrity were such that he deserved readmission. Following the two year suspension the board certified that he had shown the
required improved character. The Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision
agreed. 5 7 The dissent questioned why the Board of Bar Examiners only
considered his conduct during the last two years, rather than his behavior
over a longer period of time.
The same three justices also dissented in the Matter of Rzchard H.
Mays. 15' The Supreme Court Committee had investigated charges that
he converted client funds. After he offered to surrender his license for six
months the Committee made a favorable recommendation to the
Supreme Court, which accepted the license. This case is interesting because three justices thought the penalty was too light. In addition to surrendering his license the attorney was required to apply for reinstatement
through the office of the Board of Bar Examiners, but the Court did not
specify that the Bar examination be retaken. Unlike other jurisdictions,
the Arkansas Bar Examination does not contain a separate ethics section
that must be passed.' Retaking and passing such a portion might be another appropriate means of determining the fitness of a suspended attorney to practice law.
The Court gradually appears to be clarifying the terms under which
an attorney may surrender his license to practice and seek readmission
some time in the future. Although the Rules should not spell out every
possible variation of a disciplinary sanction, rewording of the Rules to
suggest the possibilities available to the Committee and trial judges would
be helpful. A formal rule on reinstatement might also eliminate some of
the problems associated with conditions of readmission. Such a rule
might provide that a petition for reinstatement be permitted only after
the passage of a minimum period of time and only with the recommendations of the disciplinary committee. Since the attorney is not entitled to
reinstatement as a matter of right, the attorney should affirmatively show
evidence of present good character and legal knowledge. Finally, the nature of the affirmative proof required might vary with the gravity of the
initial offense.' 5 9
157.

In Re Wayne R. Williams, 265 Ark. 480 (1979).

158. In Re RichardH. Mays, Per Curiam Order of October 6, 1978. See note 131 supra.
159. See e.g., Illinois Supreme Court Rule 767; Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission Rule 11. The STANDARDS recommend that a disbarred attorney be
permitted to seek reinstatement only "at least five years after the effective date of disbarment and should not be readmitted unless he can show by clear and convincing evidence:
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SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION

The improvements in disciplinary enforcement made over the past
decade by the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Committee on Professional Conduct have been significant. But the case law development in
the law of disciplinary enforcement needs to be codified and expanded.
Of the following suggestions, some could be implemented immediately by
the Arkansas Supreme Court or by the Committee, while controversial
0
measures might best be initiated by the Arkansas legal community.16
1) The Committee should receive increased financial support and expanded staffing.
2) The types of sanctions available to the Committee and courts
should be expanded with possible alternatives including public
reprimands, interim suspensions, probation, restitution and court
costs.
3) A clear indication should be given that courts may suspend or disbar an attorney conditionally.
4) Standards for reinstatement should be created.
5) Notice to and protection of the clients of attorneys who are no
longer qualified to practice should be provided.
6) Attorneys who have voluntarily surrendered their licenses or have
been publicly disciplined should have their names publicized.
7) The public should be informed of the functions of the committee.
8) Lay persons should sit on the Committee.*
9) The Committee should be authorized to grant immunity against
criminal prosecution to possible wrongdoers.
10) A clarification of the privilege protecting Committee members, complainants, and witnesses should be provided.
11) Reorganizing and rewriting the rules in their entirety should be considered.
The Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct need
not be ashamed of its activities over the past decade. Lacking proper
resources and support, hampered by inadequate rules, and applying inconsistent judicial decisions; the Committee has nevertheless carried out
its difficult task creditably. Its primary failing has been in a distinct lack
of aggressiveness in dealing with the Arkansas Supreme Court, in seeking
out and investigating non-pecuniary forms of misconduct, in pursuing effective deterrent sanctions, in promoting its existence and activities, and
in publicizing its own accomplishments.
rehabilitation, fitness to practice, competence and compliance with all applicable discipline
or disability orders and rules." STANDARDS, note 11 supra, at 32.
160. See Cox, Pres dent's Report, 13 ARK. LAW. 138 (1979).
* Editor's Note: Since this article was written, the composition of the Committee has
been changed to include non-lawyers. See note 10 supra. The Court also modified Rule 3 by
a per curiam order dated February 19, 1980 which requires certain Committee actions to be
filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. See note 70 supra.
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